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Abstract
Taking a point of departure in the ﬂuid political and economic landscape 
of East and Southeast Asia, this paper focuses on ethnic Chinese SME en-
trepreneurs in Southeast Asia, who are gradually becoming the focus in a 
discussion of whether a rising Mainland Chinese economy is a positive or 
negative force in Asia. Contrary to the coherent nature usually associated with 
this particular ethnic group, this article argues, that in fact it is divided into 
many smaller factions. This differentiation of the ethnic Chinese community 
in Southeast Asia, it is argued, is a reﬂection of many different inﬂuences 
from, especially, colonialism, and different contemporary social and political 
developments within the individual Southeast Asian countries. This increas-
ing societal complexity makes ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs vulnerable in the 
wake of a rising Mainland Chinese economy, as they await to see if the latter 
impacts positively or negatively on the various Southeast Asian economies, 
thus indirectly inﬂuencing how they are embedded within their societies.
Keywords: China, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Chinese entrepreneurship, 
national politics, ethnicity.
Assessing China's economic impact on Southeast Asia
According to observers, it is critical for Southeast Asian economies to 
understand China's economic development, and to understand how to 
counter potentially devastating and predatory competition from that 
country. The main background for such a statement is based on the fact 
that China, in 2002, emerged as the world's largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), thus diverting some of the FDI ﬂows that might 
otherwise have gone to Southeast Asia (Yeung 2006: 7-8). Furthermore, 
roughly 75 percentt of China's cumulative incoming FDI has come 
from Asian economies.  Almost 80 percent of all FDI into Asia in 2001 
_________________________________________________________________________29
_______________________________________ Living in the Shadow of Mainland China
went to China. China was earlier competing with Malaysia, Thailand, 
the Philippines and Indonesia, since they were the countries most de-
pendent on foreign investment and technology.  However, capital now 
ﬂows into China, thus restraining the Southeast Asian countries from 
moving up the value-added ladder. This means that Asian economies 
with the technical capabilities to stay ahead of China, will beneﬁt from 
China's economic growth, whereas those that rely on foreign technol-
ogy, will ﬁnd their positions threatened by China (Wanandi 2002: 231, 
Bolt 2000: 111).
Arguably, the economies that will beneﬁt the most from China, are 
those that can penetrate the growing Chinese market, develop comple-
mentary relations with the Chinese economy, attract investment from 
China and create development partnerships with China. Mari Pangesty 
adds that given greater openness, growth in Chinese domestic demand, 
coupled with growth of its labour intensive exports (which are still 
dependent on raw material and intermediate inputs) certain imports 
from Southeast Asian countries are likely to increase. These products 
are oil, gas, wood, rubber, agriculture based products, together with 
manufactured products such as electrical machinery. Indonesia is a 
case in point here, due to its large amount of natural resources. It is up 
to each individual Southeast Asian country to ensure competitiveness 
when supplying these products to China and so beneﬁt from a rising 
Chinese economy (Pangesty 2002: 85).
The rising economic power of China, when combined with Japan and 
Korea, threatens to turn Southeast Asia (except for Singapore) into an 
'economic sideshow'. Jusuf Wanandi stresses that it would be wise for 
Southeast Asia to commit China to a regional web of rules and institu-
tions so as to be able to contain, and partly control, the economic might 
of China (Wanandi: 2002: 232-33). Mari Pangesty also stresses the im-
portance of creating regional networks based on free trade agreements 
such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN+3, combined with 
bilateral trade relations between China and each of the different South-
east Asian countries. Compared to regionalism in the Americas and the 
enlargement of Europe, East and Southeast Asia are still searching for 
their own institutional identity (Pangesty 2002: 81).
The implication here is that it is imperative to prevent the develop-
ment of a rigid centre-periphery structure between East and Southeast 
Asia with all the bilateral patron-client relationships that this entails. 
From the perspective of Southeast Asia, the means to contain China 
economically, and to a lesser extent, East Asia in general is thus through 
30 ______________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 25•2007
Michael Jacobsen ___________________________________________________________
regional cooperation, where free-trade agreements are the means, and 
equality in partnership, the goal.
China's ascendance to economic superpower status does not, however, 
only mean doom and gloom for the Southeast Asian economies. Becom-
ing a big economy also brings with it a growing domestic demand for 
(imported) goods, and thus an expanding home market. For example, 
according to Bloomberg News1 the Asia-Paciﬁc region exported 44 
per cent to China in the 10 months before October 2004, equivalent to 
US$219.7 billion. Malaysia alone sent 16.2  percent  of its foreign ship-
ments to China in the ﬁrst half of 2003, ﬁve times as much as in 2000. 
Due to annual growth rates of 8.5  percent in 2003, 9.3  percent in 2005 
a further 9.4  percent in 2006 and a predicted 9.5  percent in 2007, China 
is now the fastest growing economy within the group of ten biggest 
economies in the world. China is also a new source of income for the 
developing economies in other parts of Asia.
The Bloomberg News2 agency reports that the downside to this, how-
ever, is that these growth rates, which attract a huge amount of FDI, 
may reduce the prospects for growth in such countries as South Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand,. The combination of low inputs of 
FDI, and a China oriented export economy, carries the potential threat 
for at least some of the Southeast Asian economies, in that it makes them 
even more dependent on China's ability to drive export-led recoveries, 
thus reinforcing the emerging centre-periphery structure. This poten-
tial negative development is, however, more or less outweighed by 
the acknowledgment that a growing China is also bringing its trading 
partners along with it.
It is against this background of a ﬂuid, and potentially volatile, eco-
nomic landscape in East and Southeast Asia, that this paper focuses 
on one particular ethnic group that has become a centre piece in the 
discussion of whether a rising Chinese economy is a benevolent or 
predatory force3, that is, ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. First of all 
we have to debunk the general stereotypes applied to this particular 
ethnic group. Contrary to notions of a coherent ethnic and cultural 
nature ascribed to this particular group, this paper argues that in fact 
it is divided into many smaller and non-afﬁliated fractions both eco-
nomically, politically as well as culturally. This is due to a question 
of national loyalty, combined with a host of different economic and 
cultural preferences in connection with the countries in which the 
ethnic Chinese reside. Second, this differentiation within the ethnic 
Chinese community in Southeast Asia, is furthermore reinforced by 
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multi-dimensional impacts emanating from colonialism, as well as 
different types of social and religious constraints found in the different 
communities and nations of residence. Third, this combination makes 
the ethnic Chinese vulnerable to the negative effects of a rising Chinese 
economy, especially those that hit Southeast Asian national economies. 
For the purposes of this paper, the study will focus on ethnic Chinese 
who live in Indonesia and Malaysia. Finally, this paper does not cen-
tre on major ethnic Chinese controlled ﬁrms and conglomerates, but 
rather on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), as they exhibit 
a greater divide between national loyalties and local constraints, not 
only towards other ethnic Chinese, but also towards their non-Chinese 
local and national compatriots.
Chinese Entrepreneurship in a Southeast Asian Context
The impact of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia has been docu-
mented since the 14th century. It was, however, not until the beginning 
of the 18th and 19th centuries, that migrants and travellers, especially 
from the southern part of Mainland China, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan 
and Guangxi provinces, began in earnest to settle down in Southeast 
Asia, especially in today's Malaysia and Indonesia. Here they worked 
as either indentured labourers in the European owned plantation and 
mines, or settled down as traders of various kinds. These migrants used 
already existing Chinese networks. These were based on transplanted 
conceptions of common religious denominations, language or dialect, 
and descent afﬁliations together with guilds, which were sometimes 
organised like secret societies. The common denominators behind these 
modes of organising were group identiﬁcation and principles of guanxi, 
xinyong and kongsi, for example.4
In particular, guanxi afﬁliations appear to be the longest lasting. For 
example, several observers have argued that guanxi afﬁliations5 within 
a Chinese network were, and still are, a kind of modus operandi for do-
ing business within the ethnic Chinese business community.6 The all-
encompassing nature attributed to guanxi-afﬁliated networks is also 
prevalent in discourses on the Chinese diaspora, that is, the generic 
name for overseas Chinese networking practices.7 For Kotkin (1992), for 
example, the Chinese diaspora is characterised by an enduring sense 
of group identiﬁcation and global linkages, and for Callahan (2002) the 
comparative advantage of the diaspora's Confucian reading of capital-
ism, is that cultural ties lower the transaction costs of doing business in 
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China and Southeast Asia, compensating for ill-developed legal system 
in this region.8
These perceptions of capitalism in a Chinese context, as constituting 
a kind of non-grounded transnational ﬂow of ethnic capital, that mainly 
thrived within close-knit circles, and maintained by age-old Chinese 
kinship, language or even philosophical afﬁliations, have an Oriental-
ist feel attached to them.9 However, when taking a critical look at the 
literature on the relationship between contemporary Chinese business 
enterprises and guanxi afﬁliated networks in East and Southeast Asia, 
an absence of a deep inﬂuence of the latter on the former, together with 
a lack of cohesiveness within the Chinese diaspora per se, are revealed. 
Wong (1998), Gomez and Hsiao (2001) and Jacobsen (2006) all have 
problems ﬁnding evidence for a dominance of chain-related guanxi 
afﬁliated business deals within the diaspora, based on ethnic afﬁnities 
or shared identities.
On the contrary, proﬁt driven motives seem to prevail, be it with 
intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic business relations, thus also linking up with 
domestic, non-Chinese, business communities in the host country. This 
ﬂow between the Chinese diaspora, governed partly by personal strat-
egies and partly by contextual circumstances, is a practice that Riggs 
(2001) has deﬁned processes of 'diasporisation' and 'de-diasporisation'. 
This occurs when switching from mono-ethnic to multi-ethnic spatial 
relations, be they local, national or international Cribb (2000).  Gomez 
and Hsiao (2004) furthermore contest the thesis that the institutions, 
norms and practices of the ethnic Chinese are the main reason for the 
growth of their enterprises. Moreover, they question whether Chinese 
entrepreneurs have depended primarily on business networks based 
on shared identities to develop their corporate base.
This argument is further expanded by Qiu Liben (2000) who writes 
that if one examines contemporary Southeast Asian Chinese networks 
in an historical context, it can be seen that they were not products of 
the economic and cultural expansion of China, but rather the product 
of a global capitalist expansion. She continues:
'The Chinese networks themselves have changed with the needs of time; 
they developed from the networks of bangs (organisations based on guanxi 
like connections, MJ) to the networks of the overseas Chinese and then to the 
open and multi-cultural networks shared by citizens of various countries. 
This has enabled them to play an important role in the sustained economic 
development of Southeast Asia and in integration of the region' (Qiu 2000: 
203).
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This conﬁrms Arif Dirlik's (1996) proposition that guanxi business 
practices are an 'ethnicisation' of universal capitalist practices and not 
speciﬁcally Chinese economy paralleling global capitalism. Returning 
to the discussion of the cohesiveness generally attributed to the Chinese 
diaspora, this paper agrees with the idea that a diaspora constitutes a 
decentred, multi-levelled and fractious, generally ethnically afﬁliated, 
ideational network which allows people to move in and out of a given 
diaspora depending on their current social and political situation.10 The 
adherence to a perceived relevant diaspora thus depends on relative 
social, economic, and political contextual givens. An understanding 
of a given diaspora does therefore not depend on systemic network 
approaches. That is, theoretical constructs underpinning the empirical 
and geographical constraints, as indicated by Ong and Nonini (1997), 
but rather by analysing de facto socio-political contexts, that delineate 
the positioning of an individual in an appropriate diaspora. By taking 
such an approach, it is imperative to focus on those social, political, 
and economic forces that have the capacity to generate changes in the 
societal embedding of the ethnic Chinese.
Home Country or Country of Residence?  
Chinese Entrepreneurs and the Dominant 'Other'
The above discussions, result in the main question asked in this paper: 
having disentangled Chinese network practices and having stressed how 
imperative it is to focus on the social, political, and economic factors that 
have a capability of generating changes in the societal embedment of 
the ethnic Chinese, how have the ethnic Chinese have reacted towards 
the growing Mainland Chinese economy? Arguably, by focusing on 
ethnic Chinese SMEs and stressing the importance of analysing them in 
relation to their societal embededness, the importance of the Mainland 
Chinese market comes second to those entrepreneurs. They have to 
secure primarily their freedom of manoeuvre in their communities of 
residence, a freedom that is guided just as much by social and cultural 
strategies as by cynical economic calculations or emotional or ideologi-
cal attachments to 'the old country'.
This argument becomes more important as the rising Mainland Chi-
nese economy inﬂuences, positively or negatively, the economic perform-
ances of the various countries in the Southeast Asian region. Moreover, 
this again inﬂuences the domestic attitude towards the ethnic Chinese in 
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their respective communities of residence11. Arguably, the ethnic Chinese 
in Southeast Asia do not unilaterally embrace the expanding Chinese 
economy, as it has a certain impact on their freedom of manoeuvre in 
their communities of residence. Instead we see a careful balancing of 
how to achieve the better of the two worlds, which result in the increased 
potential for expanding one's business without jeopardising the relation-
ship to the dominant non-Chinese social and political environment.
Before further discussing this through two case studies (both from 
the provincial capital Manado in North Sulawesi Province in eastern 
Indonesia and from Johor Baru in the State of Johor in southern Ma-
laysia), the paper highlights an important non-economic concomitant 
effect of an economically strong Mainland China, namely a further 
visualisation of the Southeast Asian Chinese conceived of as a minor-
ity group in the respective countries of residence, a visualisation that 
carries the potential for a further negative stigmatisation of this already 
exposed group. Here the discussion refers to the relationship between 
a generational conditioned division within the ethnic Chinese com-
munities themselves, namely a distinction between peranakan and totok 
ethnic Chinese. This generational conditioned is reﬂected in the fact 
that peranakans have lived for ﬁve to six generations in Southeast Asia, 
whereas totoks have mainly one or two generations behind them in a 
Southeast Asian context. As the latter has much closer relationships to 
Mainland China than the former, a process of re-siniﬁcation is taking 
place between the two categories of ethnic Chinese, a process that is 
fuelled indirectly by a growing economic impact from Mainland China. 
As this has a destabilising effect on the relationship between these two 
groups, a further differentiation within, and additional visualisation of, 
the different ethnic Chinese communities is gradually taking place in 
their respective countries and communities of residence. The following 
discussion draws mainly on Indonesian material, but some more gen-
eral political and economic ramiﬁcations of this problem, for the ethnic 
Chinese across the Southeast Asian region will be considered.
In Indonesia and Malaysia, peranakans were formerly known as Baba, 
or early immigrants to the region. Babas used their local position to 
claim higher status compared to the Sinkeh, the newly arrived Chinese 
immigrants (Tan 1997: 25–6). A derogative usage of the term Baba can 
be found when coupling it with the term Ali. Ali-Baba refers to a joint 
Indonesian-Chinese business venture, or more speciﬁcally, to an In-
donesian front ﬁgure or sleeping partner in an enterprise owned and 
ﬁnanced by an ethnic Chinese.
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According to William Skinner (1996: 78–9) peranakan refers to those 
ethnic Chinese who have developed a creolised or mestizo-like culture 
with strong Indonesian characteristics. The most important characteris-
tics of the peranakans were, and still, are that they marry local Indonesian 
women and speak Bahasa Indonesia within the family. Proﬁciency in 
Chinese languages and knowledge of traditional Chinese culture has 
gradually disappeared and today, most peranakans do not speak, read 
or write Chinese.
The other main group of Indonesian ethnic Chinese is the totok. This 
term refers to 'full-blooded' Chinese in Indonesia. They are relatively re-
cent immigrants or children of recent immigrants, who speak one or two 
Chinese languages, and practice traditional Chinese customs within the 
family (Skinner 1996: 86, 88–92). The totoks generally represent Hokkien, 
Cantonese, and Hakka speaking areas in Southeast China. Speech-group 
identiﬁcation is an important means for identifying group membership. 
Because of laws implemented by the Indonesian government in 1959 
and onwards, forbidding non-Indonesian people to engage in retail 
trade outside towns, many Totoks moved from the Outer Islands to the 
commercial centres, especially around Jakarta and the other main cities 
in Indonesia, where some of their most important markets were.
Leaving aside this distinction for a moment, the Indonesian authori-
ties and the society in general, have always been ambivalent towards 
the ethnic Chinese, peranakans and totoks alike. This can be observed by 
studying the anti-Chinese riots through Indonesian political history. 
Here the paper alludes to comparison of negative social, economic, 
and political developments with the appearance of anti-Chinese riots. 
A main precondition for this correlation is that the ethnic Chinese are 
generally conceived of as a foreign minority, and are thus classiﬁed 
as non-pribumi or 'not sons of the soil', that is, non-indigenous people. 
Furthermore, international political developments have also helped in 
fuelling anti-ethnic Chinese resentments within the Indonesian com-
munity, thus reinforcing the above mentioned grievances towards the 
ethnic Chinese.
For example, in the early 1950s, the newly established communist 
government in Mainland China opened an embassy in Jakarta's Chi-
natown, which was followed up by a number of consulates in other 
major cities throughout Indonesia. The diplomats were very active in 
contacting the ethnic Chinese. This resulted in a 're-siniﬁcation' of the 
Chinese communities in terms of an increasing ﬂow of Chinese literature, 
the opening of many Chinese language schools, and a resurrection of 
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Chinese religions, together with the building of temples throughout the 
country. The main aim of these activities was to help establish the ethnic 
Chinese as a recognised ethnic group that was on an equal footing with 
other ethnic groups in Indonesia. It was thus a process of integration 
and not one of assimilation.
These developments brought the Chinese communities to public at-
tention, and questions of political loyalty and national belonging became 
a hotly debated topic. According to Mely Tan (1997), of the 2.45 million 
ethnic Chinese believed to live in Indonesia during the 1950s, about one 
million could be considered having dual nationality, that is, having 
citizenship in both Mainland China and Indonesia. In order to correct 
this, the Indonesian government decided to force the ethnic Chinese 
to make a choice between citizenship in one or the other country. This 
resulted in the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality, signed in 
Bandung on 22 April 1955, when it was decided that ethnic Chinese had 
to choose which nationality they preferred during the period January 
1960 to January 1962. Most of the about one million ethnic Chinese with 
dual nationality registered and out of those about 65 percent opted for 
Indonesian citizenship. In practice this meant a huge exodus of ethnic 
Chinese, about 400,000 people, from Indonesia, heading towards the 
new Chinese nation (Tan 1997: 33–5).
However, problems for the ethnic Chinese had, only begun. In 1957, 
the authorities demanded that all Indonesian citizens attended Indone-
sian schools. This meant that thousands of Chinese schools were closed. 
The period around 1965–6 was a particular difﬁcult one, as many Chinese 
were killed and driven out of, for example, Aceh, North Sumatra, and 
the rural areas in west Kalimantan. The main reason for this was that it 
was thought, especially by the political elite and the military, that the 
ethnic Chinese were collaborating with the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) and that the ﬁrst president Sukarno was relying too heavily on 
the Chinese and PKI for political support.
This situation further changed when President Suharto's New Order 
regime (1966–98) replaced what was left of Sukarno's Guided Democracy 
in 1965. The new regime initiated an intense programme of assimilating 
the ethnic Chinese into the Indonesian community by forbidding Chi-
nese names, signs in Chinese characters in public places, publications, 
cultural and religious practices, constructions of new temples, etc. so 
as to domesticate and pull the Chinese into mainstream New Order 
Indonesia. Nonetheless, despite these assimilatory initiatives, the ethnic 
Chinese were still discriminated against both in terms of education (they 
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could not join the majority of universities) and could not get employ-
ment in the bureaucracy and military. Even the most assimilated ethnic 
Chinese were marked out, as all Chinese had a code in their passport 
indicatung they were of Chinese descent, and thus not 'blue-blooded' 
pribumi Indonesians.12
After President Suharto was toppled on 21 May 1998 things changed 
again. The interim president Habibie and the following two presidents, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, allowed the ethnic 
Chinese to practice their traditions, especially the Chinese New Year, 
learn Chinese languages, publicize newspapers and books in Chinese, 
and generally make Chinese culture more visible in Indonesian soci-
ety. The forced assimilation programme was thus formally abolished. 
This new zeitgeist was seen in a presidential decree issued in 1998, that 
instructed ministers and chiefs within the bureaucracy to scrap all dis-
criminatory practices against the ethnic Chinese. In May 1999 Chinese 
initiated political parties such as the Chinese-Indonesian Reform Party 
were formed, and the renowned economist Kwik Kian Gie became 
deputy chairman of Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Later on the same year, he became Coordinat-
ing Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry in the Abdurrahman 
Wahid/Megawati Sukarnoputri administration. He was thus the ﬁrst 
ethnic Chinese to attain a ministerial portfolio in the post-Suharto era. 
After sizing power in July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri's administra-
tion, represented by the Minister of Religious Affairs, issued Decree No. 
13 stipulating that Imlek or the Chinese New Year was a public holiday. 
The inauguration of the current Indonesian president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, who took ofﬁce in October 2004, has seen a continuation 
of the ethnic policies of the previous presidents, thus furthering the 
establishment of the Chinese as an integrated part of the Indonesian 
society. On the basis of these changes, life for the Indonesian ethnic 
Chinese has become somewhat easier.
These changes, however positive they may be, also pose new chal-
lenges for the Chinese communities. The remaining discrimination 
against them, especially in terms of obtaining Indonesian citizenship 
and having to state their ethnic origins in their passport, still lingers 
on, not forgetting the general anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesian 
society, encouraged by the New Order regime through the years it held 
power. What is more problematic, however, is a growing split within 
the ethnic Chinese community itself, a split that revolves around the 
question of identity. Although not an entirely new problem, the ques-
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tion of how to designate themselves has particularly come to a head in 
the post-Suharto era. Labels such as Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Chinese, 
Chinese nationals or Nationals of Chinese Descent have been applied 
to the ethnic Chinese, not only in Indonesia, but throughout Southeast 
Asia, indicating a tense relationship amongst the ethnic Chinese, their 
respective nation states, and their relationship to Mainland China thus 
turning an ethnic label into a problematic political signiﬁer. For example, 
Leo Suryadinata (1997: 20) writes that for recent migrants their ethnic 
identity is stronger than their national identity. This is not a problem 
when Mainland China's relations with the individual Southeast Asian 
states are cordial. However, when China–Southeast Asian relations 
turn sour, as in the case of, for example, the Spratly Islands issue, then 
the ethnic Chinese generally become the focus of resentment from the 
indigenous populations.
The tendency in many parts of the region to classify the ethnic Chinese 
as nationalized foreigners with a doubtful political loyalty towards their 
respective community of residence, also poses tremendous problems for 
the ethnic Chinese themselves. If labelled 'Overseas Chinese', they are 
not thought of as true nationals in their community of residence, only 
visitors with perceived strong ties to Mainland China, who might pose 
a national political threat. If individuals are labelled as 'Ethnic Chinese', 
and with many generations in their community or residence behind 
them, then they are more or less socially and politically marginalized. 
This can be seen especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
The dual nature of the ethnic Chinese identity thus represents a national 
security liability. As a counter move towards such negative stigmatisa-
tion, Tan Chee Beng (1997: 29) states:
'Overall, the Chinese in Southeast Asia should not be called “Overseas 
Chinese” as it is a label which is appropriate only for citizens of China living 
overseas'.
He continues:
'As proud citizens of our respective countries, we feel insulted to be called 
or even referred to as “Overseas Chinese”. We are overseas in China but 
not when we are at home in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so 
forth' (Tan 1997: 25).
The main question here is whether the Southeast Asian states will let 
the ethnic Chinese themselves decide how they prefer to be labelled. As 
we have seen in the case of Indonesia, the foundations of this lie within 
national politics that decide what label to apply to the ethnic Chinese. 
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Parallel to these external discourses, internal divisions from within 
the ethnic Chinese communities themselves are gradually surfacing, 
the previous distinction made between peranakans and totoks.
Today the relationship between peranakans and totoks highlights the 
heterogeneity of the ethnic Chinese community. They have never been 
a homogeneous group as maintained by Suryadinata (1997), as the eth-
nic Chinese reﬂect different social and political circumstances in their 
respective communities of residence, as well as different circumstances 
under which they became ethnic Chinese in a Southeast Asian context. 
The continued difference between peranakan and totok Chinese thus 
represents a deep differentiation of the ethnic Chinese community. The 
ﬁrst stands for assimilation into the communities of residence, the latter, 
trying to accommodate policies of assimilation, but with due respect 
towards Chinese culture and traditions.
This leads us back to the main thrust of this paper, namely how an 
economical powerful Mainland China is being perceived by the ethnic 
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. For example, in the shadow 
of Mainland China's ascendance towards economic superpower status, 
totoks try to're-scinicise'  peranakans and to make them acknowledge 
their ethnic and cultural background, thus making them more visible 
as a distinct ethnic group in relation to other ethnic groups in the host 
community. The reason  behind this strategy, is to put them in a better 
position to link up to Mainland Chinese' domestic markets through, 
for examples, diasporic linkages, or to act as guanxi or go-between-
partners to either bumiputra or pribumi economic parties, in Malaysia 
and Indonesia respectively, with a similar interest in entering Mainland 
Chinese markets.
This strategy might, however, backﬁre on the ethnic Chinese com-
munities themselves. Apart from the possibility of generating a further 
negative stigmatisation of the ethnic Chinese per se, as those who are in 
charge of initiating economic revitalisation at the expense of the indig-
enous entrepreneurs, it might also increase tensions between the two 
groups, especially as the peranakans have deep-rooted vested interests in 
the local communities. In fact, these vested interests are their insurance 
for a positive acceptance by the 'dominant other' in their community of 
residence. Ultimately, the totok initiated 're-siniﬁcation' initiative carries 
the potential negative impact that the host communities become even 
more suspicious towards the ethnic Chinese in general: what are they 
up to, whom do they represent, and are they really the loyal citizens 
they claim to be?
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The paper now turns to two small case studies of ethnic Chinese 
SME business communities in Manado, the provincial capital of North 
Sulawesi, Indonesia, and in Johor Baru in the State of Johor, southern 
Malaysia. In particular, it will focus on how they relate to their respec-
tive communities of residence and whether the current economic events 
in Mainland China have any inﬂuence on their current economic per-
formance.
On the Societal Embedding of Southeast Asian Chinese 
Entrepreneurs: Two Case Studies
Manado in North Sulawesi Province, Eastern Indonesia
Two things stand out when studying the Manadonese Chinese Busi-
ness community. The ﬁrst is a high emphasis placed on assimilating 
into the Minahasa community13, a preferred societal positioning that is 
underlined by referring to oneself as a peranakan. Stressing assimilation 
instead of integration and categorising oneself as peranakan, is similar 
to stressing both a diachronic and synchronic sense of belonging. Being 
a peranakan emphasises having roots in the local community and being 
assimilated refers to an abolition of ethnic differences. At face value, 
these two main aspects of being Manadonese Chinese could be one of 
the factors that explain why there have not been any violent clashes 
between ethnic Chinese and the Minahasa before, during and after the 
fall of the New Order regime.
The second thing about the Manadonese Chinese is that they do not 
stand out as a distinct ethnic group among the Minahasa. On the con-
trary, even the Minahasa stress the almost total assimilation of the Chi-
nese into the local communities. It seems as this can, to a certain degree, 
be attributed to the fact that the mechanisms for marking oneself out as 
a distinct group do not inﬂuence the current inner functioning of the 
Manadonese Chinese. For example, guanxi afﬁliations do not play an im-
portant role within the ethnic Chinese business community even though 
they can still be identiﬁed as a social signiﬁer amongst the Manadonese 
Chinese. As such, this study subscribes to Gomez and Hsiao's critique of 
guanxi practices in a modern economy. As previously stressed, it is the 
proﬁt motive that plays the greatest role for the Chinese entrepreneurs 
when conducting business, not ethnic factors or cultural preferences, 
a fact that also goes for the Manadonese Chinese entrepreneurs. As a 
result, the paper argues that Dirlik's point that guanxi is more about a 
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rhetorically dictated ethniﬁcation of capitalist practices, is not a practi-
cal one. Kongsi practices and guanxi afﬁliations are thus only invoked 
if they can lead towards higher or more stable proﬁt margins. In this 
sense, continuing to stress guanxi as a dominating aspect of Chinese 
business practices, in at least Manado, can be categorised as a kind of 
cultural chauvinism within a speciﬁc business environment.
An interesting consequence of the non-dominant position of guanxi 
in the Manadonese Chinese business community is that, because it is so 
weak, it actually undermines the functioning and effectiveness of kongsi 
organised businesses. Arguably, guanxi afﬁliations can be conceived 
of as reinforcing the inner workings of kongsi organised businesses, as 
both strive towards reinforcing relations between the Chinese partners 
and thus indirectly promote a distinct Chinese-ness in terms of busi-
ness practices. However, guanxi only constitute but one out of several 
business strategies when establishing kongsi based companies. This 
de-linked relationship between guanxi and kongsi therefore reinforces 
processes of assimilation and down plays the development of a distinct 
ethnic identity. Such a development is reinforced by yet another fac-
tor, namely religious afﬁliations. Christianity, the dominant religion in 
North Sulawesi, is generally seen as a facilitator between non-Buddhist 
Chinese and Christian Minahasans. Christian Chinese by far outnumber 
Buddhist Chinese, so processes of assimilation are further reinforced.
However, taking processes of assimilation to their ultimate limits, 
leads towards the assumption that ethnically distinctive features be-
come hybridised to such an extent that the original ethnic identities 
involved are gradually dissolved and a new, commonly agreed upon 
cultural denominator, arises. Such a perspective can only be an illusion. 
Assimilation processes are always based on asymmetrical relationships. 
In the case of the Manadonese Chinese and the Minahasa, the latter is 
the dominant half, and it would be difﬁcult to imagine that they would 
give away any of their perception of ethnic supremacy in relation to 
the ethnic Chinese. As such, assimilation processes are about stipulat-
ing power relations that are manifested in social integration and more 
or less peaceful co-existence. Ethnic distinctions remain despite these 
processes, but descend towards a lower level of social practice. They 
only resurface during ceremonial occasions, which are socially detached 
and socially accepted by the dominant 'other'.
A somewhat unexpected consequence of these processes is that the 
Manadonese Chinese become separated from the Chinese diaspora. By 
far the greatest numbers of informants have detached themselves from 
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their ancestral root in either Fujian or Guangdong Province. Mainland 
China is currently being conceived of as either a potential promising 
target for doing transnational business, or as an interesting tourist desti-
nation. The 'home' part of the Chinese diaspora has thus been separated 
from the otherwise classical triangular perception of diasporic constel-
lations, namely the 'home-host-migrant' construct. This points towards 
the fact that diasporas are multi-dimensional entities that are contextual 
deﬁned. Even though the Manadonese Chinese have currently cut off 
the 'home' part of the Chinese diaspora, the linkages are still there, but 
dormant. This means that when not activated, diasporic links descend 
into a deeper layer within peoples' minds, and remain there until vari-
ous social and political events jolt them back into existence.
On the basis of this, it is possible to say that a diaspora is a latent struc-
ture, that is, not a permanently established ethnic oriented national or 
international path for migrants and travellers. A diaspora only becomes 
alive locally when certain social, political or economic events highlight 
or squeeze a certain ethnic group. This conﬁrms Riggs's (2001) notion of 
diasporasation and de-diasporasation as people utilise a given diaspora 
when they need it., otherwise it does not exist for them. North Sulawesi 
provides them with a social and political safe heaven, and the Mina-
hasa accepts the Chinese in their midst as they constitute an important 
economic factor in the province. Therefore, the Manadonese Chinese 
are highly localised, that is, 'assimilated' and thus de-linked from the 
Chinese diaspora. For how long these positive inter-ethnic relationships 
will last, depends on a whole range of things from economic perform-
ance, locally as well as nationally, to religious harmony, and amicable 
and non-competitive inter-ethnic relationships. When and why a shift 
in these relationships might occur, thereby giving rise to a potential re-
linking of the Manadonese Chinese to the Chinese diaspora, can only be 
determined through empirical studies, not theoretical predictions.14
Johor Baru in the State of Johor, Southern Malaysia
Contrary to the Manadonese Chinese entrepreneurs in North Sulawesi, 
there is a clear perception among the ethnic Chinese SME entrepreneurs 
in Johor Baru (JB) of being distinct from other ethnic groups in the state of 
Johor, and of being treated accordingly by the community of residence. 
The blame for this state of affairs is laid on the ofﬁcial bumiputra policy 
that favours the Malay population at the expense of the Indian, and in 
particular the ethnic Chinese, population. A consequence of this policy 
is an ofﬁcial discrimination against them: Malaysian people got most 
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of the public beneﬁts in terms of education and ﬁnancial support from 
the government, both the state and national governments. Seen from 
an ethnic Chinese point of view, they are more or less left to care for 
themselves. In terms of education, this results in most Chinese students 
going abroad or attending the many private schools and higher educa-
tion institutions to be found throughout Malaysia. There are several in 
JB, but many young people prefer to cross the Johor Strait in order to 
get their education in Singapore. The negative consequence of this is 
that many do not return to JB, but choose instead to settle down and 
marry in Singapore.
As can be seen, the relationship between ethnic Chinese and the 
bumiputra are not governed by policies of assimilation, but rather by a 
policy of a peaceful co-existence based on a framework of mutual inter-
dependency. In a sense, this relationship is perhaps more honest,, as 
it is not dressed up in a rhetoric of assimilation, as in North Sulawesi. 
This proves the previous view on the relationship between integration 
and assimilation, in that the latter is but a 'cover up' for an asymmetrical 
power relationship between the two groups. In JB, this power relation-
ship is by no means covered, but played out in the open. Due to the 
ofﬁcially sanctioned practice of ethnic discrimination, not only in the 
state of Johor but throughout Malaysia, ethnic Chinese identity contrasts 
sharply with that of Malay identity, and is spelled out in speciﬁc Chinese 
cultural and religious associations and trade organisations, such as the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other professional or 
non-professional organisations, mainly designed to serve ethnic Chinese 
interests. A somewhat negative consequence of this, is that the ethnic 
Chinese feel superior towards the Malay and Indian communities in 
terms of economic performance, but pragmatically recognise that the 
Malays in particular have the political power to impose their aspira-
tions and ambitions on them, thus forcing them to support a status quo, 
as deﬁned by the Malays.
An example of these ethnic Chinese organisations are the clan-based 
language groups. There are a variety of ethnic Chinese languages spoken 
in JB,  unlike the situation in Manado in North Sulawesi, where Hokkian 
speaking Chinese predominate, representing about 85 percent of the 
population. In JB there are Teochius, Hokkians, Hainans, Hakka, and 
Cantonese-speaking Chinese in almost equal proportions. In this sense 
it looks like totoks prevail in this part of southern Malaysia. Representa-
tives from these language groups mix, but are nonetheless divided into 
clans that provide each other with help when doing business amongst 
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themselves, with bumiputra entrepreneurs, and when linking up to busi-
ness contacts in Mainland China. In fact, all ﬁve language groups have 
formed their own associations. These are mostly social associations and 
not speciﬁcally oriented towards economic or political ends. These as-
sociations are interest groups, which means that they can exert pressure 
on politicians and parties alike by giving 'advice' about the needs and 
demands of the ethnic Chinese community. They maintain strong ties 
to Mainland China and see it their main concern to be to uphold the ties 
to the old country in terms of culture and language. They are especially 
active within the area of language, as many of the younger Chinese have 
problems speaking the various Chinese dialects or Mandarin.
As mentioned, the different clans are not exclusive. On the contrary, 
they inter-marry and initiate joint business ventures. There are, how-
ever, rather strained relations towards the bumiputra business com-
munity and the provincial and Malaysian state.  The two are closely 
related - the former is explicitly supported by the latter, thus leaving 
the ethnic Chinese (and the Indians) more and less outside inﬂuence 
in this connection. Despite these constraints, there are business related 
joint ventures between the ethnic Chinese and bumiputra. This is actu-
ally necessary if ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs are interested in getting 
government contracts for major projects. Should the Chinese companies 
succeed in gaining government contracts, they have to have at least one 
Malay representative in the company's board of directors, as the law 
requires. Such arrangements are very similar to the Ali-baba arrange-
ments in Indonesia. 
The Cantonese association is the oldest one of the ﬁve 'clans'. It was 
founded in around 1880, and has been active ever since. The Hokkien 
association is the youngest. For many, especially older ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs in JB, guanxi afﬁliations are very important for governing 
interaction within and between ﬁrms. This applies particularly in rela-
tion to the work done within and between the language associations. In-
terestingly, the guanxi-governed associations do not automatically invite 
new migrants from Mainland China to settle down in JB even though 
they have quite close connections to Mainland China. If a newly arrived 
migrant who originates from, say, Guangdong, he would not necessar-
ily have contacted the Cantonese association before leaving Mainland 
China. Generally, migration occurs on a personal initiative without the 
help of the association. The latter only becomes important when the new 
migrants have settled down in JB, as then the migrant may be invited 
to utilise the various networks of the Cantonese association.
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Guanxi practices are still important, not only within these associations, 
but also within the business community, a fact that is reinforced by a 
general perception of exclusion and social marginalisation. There are, 
however, different attitudes towards guanxi practices within the ethnic 
Chinese business community. In particular, it is among the older gen-
eration of entrepreneurs that guanxi afﬁliations are regarded as being 
very important, especially when initiating new business ventures. The 
initial meeting between new business partners, for example, is arranged 
along guanxi lines, that is, pre-organised by an intermediary that both 
parties trust.
This way of initiating and conducting business is not so prevalent 
among the younger generation of entrepreneurs. For them, Chinese 
entrepreneurs do not exist in a vacuum, as some of the older entrepre-
neurs still seem to think. They have to take account of the changing 
modes of doing business with the outside world - not only in relation to 
the Malaysian economy but also to the global one, strongly represented 
by Singapore just across the Johor Strait. Many young entrepreneurs 
regard a guanxi-dominated economy as a hindrance towards economic 
ﬂexibility and a free ﬂow of capital. Both of these economic premises are 
necessary when addressing the, at times, volatile ﬂuctuations within the 
global economy. As a consequence, a rethinking of business practices 
within the ethnic Chinese business environment in JB is beginning, as 
stiff competition from, especially Singapore, combined with a brain-
drain of the best young entrepreneurs to Singapore, is on the rise, thus 
threatening the overall economic environment and performance in 
Johor Baru.
Interestingly, it is thus Singapore - and not Mainland China - that 
poses the greatest threat towards the small scale Chinese economy in JB, 
despite the fact that Singapore is also seen as a great source of income, 
especially in terms of consumer spending. Mainland China is perceived 
as an opportunity - not a threat or a must – that can be exploited if the 
opportunity to break into that market presents itself. This is due to the 
fact that most of JB's SME enterprises (both Chinese and non-Chinese) 
are multi-directional in their search for new markets that is, towards 
the domestic market, the important Singaporean market, and towards 
other East and Southeast Asian markets.15
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Mixing the 'China Factor' and Local Constraints
One of the main purposes of this paper has been to assess the 
importance of the social and political attitudes towards the eth-
nic Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asian countries within 
the shadow of Mainland China. The main focus has been on 
ethnic Chinese SME entrepreneurs, as they are more vulnerable 
in relation to the social and political whims of their respective 
communities of residence, than the ethnic Chinese controlled 
transnational conglomerates and large ﬁrms. The two latter are 
in a much stronger position to survive more or less problematic 
changes emanating from the political establishment in their re-
spective communities of residence than the SMEs, as they are 
capable of moving their production lines and capital assets to 
other locations outside their Southeast Asian location if need be. 
Furthermore, conglomerates and larger ﬁrms are also more likely 
to follow the mainstream of international capital ﬂows in order to 
maximise their output. In these cases, guanxi and xinyong together 
with other culture speciﬁc Chinese modes of doing business have 
little inﬂuence, as the rate of proﬁtability within global capitalism 
carry much more weight16.
From a general perspective, South East Asian Chinese SMEs are more 
or less forced to comply with rules for conducting business that are in 
their communities of residence. This applies particularly when dealing 
with non-Chinese entrepreneurs. When doing business on an intra-
ethnic basis, that is, with other ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, guanxi 
and other culture speciﬁc Chinese modes of business practices have a 
much greater inﬂuence. This does not mean, however, that intra-ethnic 
business practices are exclusively conducted along culturally deﬁned 
modes. On the contrary, as shown in particularly the Manado case, the 
culturally informed business practices constitute but one set of practices 
out of other business practices, when designing various intra- and inter-
ethnic business strategies.
The differences between SMEs and the large Chinese controlled ﬁrms 
and conglomerates are shown in their different attitudes towards the 
economic possibilities in Mainland China. As stipulated in the beginning 
of this paper, the economies that will beneﬁt the most from China are 
those that can penetrate the growing Chinese market, develop comple-
mentary relations with the Chinese economy, attract investment from 
China, and develop partnerships with Mainland Chinese entrepreneurs. 
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Large ﬁrms and conglomerates are more able of taking advantage of 
the opportunities offered by an expanding Mainland Chinese market 
by offering superior management expertise and technological know-
how, having access to huge amounts of capital and production assets, 
things that are much wanted by Mainland Chinese entrepreneurs and 
governmental development schemes. Furthermore, if the big companies 
prefer to stay on in Southeast Asia, but still want to enter the Mainland 
Chinese market, they also have an advantage compared to the SMEs, in 
that they are capable of conforming and changing their production base 
locally, so as to be able to meet the needs of Mainland Chinese investors. 
In this sense, Mainland China constitutes a major attraction. 
These possibilities do not apply to SMEs in the same way, as they are 
more or less dependent on local conditions such as bumiputra policies 
in Malaysia and Ali-baba relationships, combined with negative stig-
matisation in Indonesia. In order words, they are more dependent on 
contextual constraints. This also means that questions of integration and 
assimilation in relation to the host community, become more important 
and decisive for whether companies orient themselves towards Main-
land China or the host community. In fact, there is not much choice. 
The local always prevails over the international, as the former is the 
one who provides the individual ethnic Chinese entrepreneur and his 
company with a framework within which to thrive - a framework that 
is not only constrained in terms of business opportunities, but also in 
terms of ethnicity and negotiated identities. On the basis of this, the 
market in Mainland China remains a distant, and possibly problematic, 
potential.
Michael Jacobsen is associate professor at Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen 
Business School (mj.int@cbs.dk).
NOTES
1  Bloomberg News 12 January 2004.
2  Yeung 2006: 7-8.
3  For a general discussion, see Bolt 2000.
4  For further details, see Jacobsen 2005.
5  A short hand deﬁnition of guanxi is that it constitutes a form of social exchange 
based on sentiments and emotions and are marked by a mutual belief in reciprocity 
and loyalty.
6  Luo (2000), Yang (1994), Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996).
7  McKeown (2001), Bolt (2000) and Gipouloux (2000).
8  For a critical discussion of 'Confucian capitalism', see Yao 2002 and Dirlik 1996. 
48 ______________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 25•2007
Michael Jacobsen ___________________________________________________________
9  For a discussion of the inner workings of the Chinese diaspora globally, see Ong 
and Nonini 1997.
10  For a fascinating discussion in this connection, see Ang (2001) and Riggs (2001).
11  Bolt 2000: 119-25, Yeung 2006: 14.
12  For further details, see Pan (1999: 157–60).
13  The Minahasa is the main ethnic group in North Sulawesi Province.
14  For more details, see Jacobsen 2006.
15  For further details, see Wee, Jacobsen, Wong 2006.
16  For a detailed account in this context, see Gomez et al. 2004.
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